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he justification of rational inference making, whether deductive or 
inductive, has been of interest to many philosophers. The problem of 
induction has concerned philosophers since the debate was first raised 
by David Hume.1  Hume argued that if induction is to be justified, nature must 
be uniform, because inductive arguments make predictions based on 
regularities in nature. Yet we have reasons to think that nature is not uniform. 
Attempts to justify the use of induction within the sciences, which began with 
Hume 2 who shows that we cannot use an inductive justification of induction, 
as this would presuppose that induction is justified, were continued by Kant in 
his discussion of strict universality.3 Yet an interesting point is elucidated by 
Carroll4 and Haack;5 that deduction is equally in need of justification despite 
the common assumption that deduction is inherently justified. In this paper I 
will focus on the attempt made by Hans Reichenbach6 to justify induction by 
pragmatic reasons, in reference to the inductive inferences we make on a 
regular basis. Other attempts have been made to show that induction is not in 
fact necessary within the sciences, for example this method was used by Karl 
Popper,7 but the fact that induction is a necessary part of human everyday 
reasoning means that a justification of induction is required even if induction is 
avoidable within the sciences. From this line of reasoning, I will show that 
although Reichenbach suggests that if any method of reasoning will work, 
induction will, this form of justification, if all else fails, can be extended to 
deduction.  I will attempt to draw analogies between the problems of induction 
and problems of deduction with Carroll’s paradox and Susan Haack’s 
arguments.  These analogies either strengthen a justification of induction by 
showing that deduction faces similar problems, or weaken our justification of 
deduction by showing it is not entirely justified. I will show that although 
                                                 
1 David Hume, Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby Bigge (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1888). 
2 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman K. Smith (New York: 
Macmillan, 1978). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Lewis Carroll, “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles,” in Mind, 4 (1895), 278–280. 
5 S. Haack, “The Justification of Deduction,” in Mind, New Series, 85:337 (Jan., 1976), 
112-119. 
6 H. Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1951). 
7 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: 
Routledge, 1963). 
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deduction does face similar problems any justification that can work for 
induction will also be applicable to deduction, but not vice versa. Finally, I will 
show that Reichenbach’s system of vindicating induction will also provide 
vindication for deduction, and argue that deduction preserves truth to a greater 
extent than induction.  
 
Induction 
 
Induction allows us to infer from a stock of knowledge of past 
observations and make a prediction of an occurrence in an unknown 
circumstance, either in the future or in an unobserved situation. From these 
predictions we also make generalisations or infer to laws of nature, stating that 
in all relevantly similar situations nature will be uniform. Skyrms sets out a 
typical inductive argument as follows: 
 
Level 1 Inductive Argument  
P1) All cases of observation O have had property P 
C) The next O will have P 
Or, if we are making a generalisation 
Ci) All instances of O will have P 
 
S k y r m s  r e f e r s  t o  t h i s  a s  m a k i n g  “ p r e d i c t i o n s  b y  w a y  o f  e p i s t e m i c  
probabilities,”8 in which we observe a certain occurrence or object and 
speculate that it will occur the same way in the future or some other 
unobserved case, even in the past or somewhere else in the universe.   
Induction is a common method of inference, yet has shown to be ineffective in 
many cases, one famously described by Bertrand Russell. His example 
describes a chicken that uses inductive reasoning to return to the same feeding 
area every day but is eventually caught by the farmer, thus; inductive reasoning 
leads to its demise. Undoubtedly it is wrong to assume that nature is uniform in 
every way, or that every perceived regularity should lead us to make universal 
generalisations. Some regularities are temporary, as was the case in the chicken 
example.  
According to Hume, for induction to be entirely justified, nature must 
be completely uniform, and the future must resemble the past. It is quite 
obvious that this is not the case, as nature is not entirely uniform and the 
future does not completely resemble the past, yet there seem to be much 
uniformity in nature. It is hard to imagine a completely chaotic universe that 
lacks regularity, but why should we assume that observed uniformities will 
persist? If there are some permanent uniformities in nature, how can we know 
which are permanent and which are not? Because we do not know if the 
principle of the uniformity of nature (PUN) will hold, Hume argues that trying 
                                                 
8 B. Skyrms, Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic (Belmont, California: 
Dickenson, 1966). 
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to justify induction by saying it is useful or that it works well can be 
problematic.  Saying that induction has been useful in the past so it will 
continue to be so in the future is itself an inductive inference. This is question 
begging as we must already assume induction to be justified.  This type of 
higher level justification also leads to counter-intuitive consequences, such as 
counter induction.  
 
Counter-inductive argument 1  
P1) All observed cases of O have P 
C) The next observed case of O will not have P 
 
What could possibly justify this way of thinking? Induction has proved 
to be useful in the past, but counter-induction has not achieved any success. 
But, we can use this fact as a justification for counter induction by applying the 
s a m e  m e t h o d  w e  d i d  t o  i n d u c t i o n .  We can establish a counter-inductive 
justification for counter-induction as follows. 
 
Counter-inductive justification for counter-induction 
P1) Counter induction has not provided true conclusions in the past 
C) Counter-induction will provide true conclusions the next time.  
 
Because counter induction has not worked in the past, by applying a 
counter-inductive inference to this, we can say that it will work in the future. 
In this way, we can establish the same kind of justification for counter-
induction as we did for induction, by supporting counter-induction counter-
inductively . Intuitively we do not expect truth preservation from counter-
inductive inferences, and the aforementioned justification is not convincing, 
but if this is the case then why should we be convinced by inductive 
justifications of induction?  It appears that we need a separate justification for 
induction, otherwise we have no reason to reject counter-induction other than 
intuition. I think that induction is a very important tool for making predictions 
and the necessity of using induction in everyday life provides a justification for 
our continued use of such inference. It seems to me that induction is necessary 
to our survival, and it is hard to imagine human existence without the regular 
use of such inferences. Reichenbach9 argues that induction need not be 
completely accurate to be useful because “the conclusion of an inductive 
inference is not asserted […] only posited […] as a means to an end”, this end 
being the prediction of future events. I will now briefly set out Reichenbach’s 
pragmatic justification of induction, and later apply this type of justification to 
the problem of deduction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy.  
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The Pragmatic Justification of Induction 
 
Although induction can notgain factual propositions to validate 
inductive inference by establishing PUN, we have much to gain from using 
induction because it can be truth preserving and provide us with predictions of 
future events with a good deal of accuracy, if not 100% probability. Not only is 
induction useful in this way, it is the best method we have for making 
predictions, and predicting the future is vital to our decision processes. Skyrms 
\analogy describes being forced to make a bet about the outcome of an event 
with the stakes being your life. . You are in a room with various light bulbs and 
you have to pick which colour light will turn on next. If you pick the wrong 
one you will be killed. You also are lead to believe that if any of the other lights 
turn on, a red light will also turn on. So, given no other information, what is 
the best choice to make? The best option, of course, is to pick red. You know 
if any option will work, picking red is the one that will. In the same way, the 
best option for making predictions is scientific induction. Skyrms argues that 
“it is impossible to justify the rule in question by proving that it will always, or 
even sometimes, yield true conclusions, given true premises[..] nevertheless, 
[Reichenbach claims that the] rule of induction should be adopted because one 
has everything to gain and nothing to lose by employing it”10 To show why this 
is the case, Reichenbach employs a method which describes how to establish a 
limiting frequency in a sequence of events. Using an options matrix, he tries to 
show that induction is the best option to use if sequences have limiting 
frequencies, and if they don’t then no method will work. 
The options matrix is meant to demonstrate that induction will work if 
anything else will. He claims that “the justification of induction is that it is the 
best instrument of action known to us.”11 Most of our actions are based on 
assumptions about what will occur in the future. I am careful not to let go of 
the object I am carrying because I predict that it will fall to the ground if I do, I 
eat my meal because I predict it would nourish me rather than poison me, and 
so on. Induction, according to Reichenbach, is the “best means to attain a 
certain aim. This aim is predicting the future”12 Firstly I shall describe 
Reichenbach’s method of attaining probabilities of occurrences. When 
witnessing a sequence of events, E, we make observations, O as to particulars 
of the event and work out the probability of O occurring whenever E does.  
Let’s use the example of rolling a dice, E being the event of rolling of the dice, 
and O being the observation of which number is facing up. We know there are 
6 options as to how the dice could fall. As we roll the dice, we may observe the 
first 12 rolls land as such: 
 
Roll #      1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10  11  12 
Number Rolled  2   4   1   1   4   3   6   1   4    2    1    2 
                                                 
10 W. Salmon, “Hans Reichenbach’s Vindication of Induction,” in Erkenntnis, 35:1-3 
(1991), 99. 
11 Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, 246. 
12 Ibid.  
 
 
M. ROSEN     159 
 
 
The frequency of rolling a 1 is 4/12, a 2 is 3/12 and so on. 
Reichenbach argues that the more events we observe, the frequency will 
become more accurate as we approach a limiting frequency in that sequence. In 
other words, our witnessed probability of an event will eventually converge 
with the true probability of an event.  The larger the sample size, the more 
accurate the frequency which we have witnessed will represent the limiting 
frequency, until we reach a reasonable degree of accuracy. We don’t expect that 
the frequency of rolling 1 is 4/12 if it is a fair dice, but this only shows that we 
have not observed a sufficient number of instances of rolled dice. Salmon 
argues that “If the limit exists, repeated application of that rule will lead sooner 
or later to posits that are accurate to any desired degree of approximation”13 I 
expect if I roll the dice a sufficient number of times, the frequency of each 
number will be 1/6, assuming it is a fair dice. One could argue that this would 
require PUN to hold if we are to attain truth preserving results. If we expect 
there to be regularity in the frequency of events, we already assume that there 
are certain regularities in the world; probabilistic regularities. This method of 
justification relies on limiting frequencies, a type of probabilistic regularity, for 
accurate results. If sequences do not have limiting frequencies, induction will 
not yield accurate predictions.  But if the sequences do have limiting 
frequencies and we use inductive inference, then we will succeed in making 
accurate predictions.  If we do not use induction, we may either fail or succeed. 
Alternatively, if sequences do not have limiting frequencies, then although 
induction will fail, any other method will fail also. Wesley Salmon sets out the 
matrix as follows. 
 
Options Matrix 
                Sequence has a limit   Sequence has no limit 
Induction is used    Success      Failure 
Induction is not used     Success or failure   Failure 14 
 
The table shows that if a sequence has a limit, and we use induction we 
will have success. Eventually observations will converge and accurately 
represent frequencies to make accurate predictions. There may be other 
systems that are successful sometimes if a sequence has a limit, but we also risk 
failure with these other systems. So there would be no reason not to use 
induction if the sequence has a limit, as it is the most successful method. But 
unfortunately it may be the case that not every sequence has a limit. If this is 
true, then induction would fail, because we need convergence to ascertain an 
accurate frequency, yet other systems will not work either. Despite the fact that 
we may rely on a version of PUN, pragmatically speaking our best bet is to use 
induction, because it has the best chance of success. 
                                                 
13 Salmon, op. cit., 102 
14 Ibid., 103.  
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This method also succeeds in providing an answer to the problem of 
the counter-induction. By this system, counter-induction would yield “radically 
incoherent sets of probability values.”15  This is because when we use induction 
to determine the frequency of an event, the frequency is established by 
observed instances of the event occurring or failing to occur, and we expect the 
frequency to become more accurate the more observations are made. If we 
tried to use counter induction as a method of ascertaining frequencies, we 
would not discover an accurate frequency of the event occurring. In fact, I 
suspect the frequencies would become more and more inaccurate, because the 
more times an event would occur, the more strongly counter-induction would 
predict that event not occurring again. There would never be a convergence of 
frequencies because counter-induction would predict the opposite of whatever 
occurrence has been regular. For example, if I used counter induction to 
ascertain whether the sun would rise each morning, I would continue to predict 
that the sun would not rise tomorrow because the frequency of the sun rising 
in my past observations has been 1 (or 100%; it has occurred every time I 
observed) so I would expect the probability of it occurring the next time to be 
very low. Counter induction would fail the pragmatic justification because it is 
not truth preserving nor does it produce accurate predictions. Therefore we 
could not use a method of converging frequencies to justify counter induction.   
Before I discuss the problem of deduction, I will mention two 
different types of justification; vindication and validation. Validation is when a 
rule is justified by a more fundamental principle. For example, trying to appeal 
to higher level principles or more fundamental rules to justify induction. This 
method was used by Skyrms16 to justify a particular inductive inference in 
reference to a higher level justification such as “inductive inferences have 
mostly worked in the past, so this inductive inference will also work. Some 
rules are considered to be the most fundamental and cannot be validated by 
more basic principles. The only way to justify these rules is by vindication; to 
show that they are truth preserving. Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification is a 
vindication of induction in contrast to Skyrms’ validation, showing that 
induction is vindicated by its practicality and because it is mainly truth 
preserving. Reichenbach would consider induction to be a fundamental 
principle, but whether or not it is sufficiently vindicated would be judged by 
how truth preserving it is.  This will become important when comparing 
induction with deduction, which is my next task. Induction serves a purpose in 
granting us the ability to predict future events while most of the time 
preserving truth. In the same way deduction is a fundamental principle, which I 
will now show may face similar difficulties as induction. In this way, it may be 
possible to strengthen the justification of induction by putting to question a 
method of inference which is arguably the most reliable. Instead I will then 
argue that deduction is nonetheless more justifiable than induction in that any 
justification that can be applied to induction will further strengthen deduction.  
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Skyrms, op cit.  
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Is Deduction Equally Problematic?  
 
Carroll’s Paradox 
 
Deductive arguments are often accepted as unproblematic as they do 
not require justification in the way inductive arguments do. We know that 
inductive arguments will not always yield true results, whereas deduction does. 
In deductively valid arguments, the premises always entail the conclusion. Yet 
Lewis Carroll argued that deduction faces similar problems to induction in that 
it is difficult to justify. Firstly I will describe Carroll’s paradox and then show 
that although it does not pose a significant problem for deduction,  from this 
arises other problems noted by Susan Haack17 which are more difficult to 
overcome.  
Carroll’s paradox sets out a simpl e  a r g u m e n t  o f  t h e  f o r m  m o d u s  
ponens. Achilles and the tortoise discuss whether we should accept the 
conclusion of such an argument given the truth of the premises;  
 
(i)  If A then B 
(ii)  A 
(c)        Therefore B 
 
Any argument with this structure will always be deductively valid, and 
thus the truth of the conclusion is believed to be entailed by the truth of the 
premises.18  Achilles explains this to the tortoise who is left unconvinced. What 
laws governs this argument that insures that it will be valid? Why should we 
accept this argument? Achilles proposes that if i and ii are true, c must be true.  The 
tortoise interprets this as being a premise of the argument, thus he insists that 
Achilles must include this as the third premise 
 
(i)  If A then B 
(ii)   A 
(iii)  if i and ii are true, then c must be true 
(c)         Therefore B 
 
After Achilles has added this premise, the tortoise is still not 
convinced, and persuades Achilles to continue adding premises that state that if 
the previous premises are accepted, the conclusion must be accepted. This 
continues on until Achilles realises that there is an infinite regress to this 
argument. To me it does not seem obvious that we should include these extra 
premises which govern modus ponens as premises within the argument. Instead 
                                                 
17 Haack, op cit. 
18 Some forms of logic give up on modus ponens, but I will not discuss this. Modus 
ponens could be substituted for any other structurally valid argument, but I will continue to use 
it for simplicity.   
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we should consider iii as a law or axiom governing the argument. If this is 
plausible, we would have no need for a regress of such premises. Yet, although 
this may solve the problem of infinite regress, we are still left with the problem 
of how to justify such an axiom. Why should we accept that if (i) and (ii) are 
true, c must be true? I will now turn to Susan Haack’s discussion of this 
problem.  
 
Haack’s Problem of Deduction 
 
Although I don’t think that an infinite regress of premises in the 
justification of deduction is a real problem, if we argue that Achilles need not 
have added the extra premises (hence avoiding infinite regress) we end up 
instead with the problem of rule circularity as we saw in the first formulation of 
the inductive justification if induction. Susan Haack argues that because of this, 
deduction is in equal need of justification as induction. Firstly she describes the 
problems of induction and deduction as analogous. To try to justify induction 
deductively would be to suggest that whenever the premises are true, the 
conclusion must be true, which would be too strong. We know that inductive 
inferences are not valid, and aren’t intended to be. Yet using induction to 
justify induction would either be circular, or end in an infinite regress of rules. 
Many philosophers assume that deduction need not be justified, yet if we look 
at this more closely, the same applies. We could either justify deduction using 
induction, so that if the premises are true, the conclusion is likely to be true 
most of the time, but this of course is too weak, as we expect deduction to be 
valid. Yet to justify deduction with deduction would end with the same 
circularity as justifying induction with induction. First I shall discuss two 
interpretations of the meaning of deduction that Haack set’s out to get to the 
heart of the problem. 
 We could either justify deduction by definition, stating that deductive 
arguments are any argument in which the premises entail the conclusion, or by 
following a set of syntactic axioms. Both types of justification, according to 
Haack, are problematic. Firstly, Haack argues that if deductive arguments need 
no justification because by definition the premises always entail the conclusion, 
this leaves us with a problem: can we know for sure that any such arguments 
exist, and if so, which ones are they? Justifying deduction by saying it is valid by 
definition does not justify individual arguments, because we have not shown 
which arguments are the deductive ones. Secondly, if deductive arguments are 
valid by definition we appear to rely on circular reasoning. The argument is 
valid because the premises entail the conclusion, and the premises entail the 
conclusion because it is a valid argument. The semantic justification of 
deduction is therefore vacuous.  
If we adopt the definition in which an argument is deductively valid 
(within a set rule of inference) if the conclusion is deducible from the premises 
by way of the axioms following the rules of inference of deduction, then we are 
left with a different problem; do these types of arguments always yield true 
result?  The rules of inference can be demonstrated by setting out a truth table  
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to demonstrate the truth values of different types of argument. Truth tables set 
out the truth values of the operators in compound propositions in deductive 
arguments, so these truth values are the rules of inference we must follow to 
ascertain the validity of an argument. But attempts to justify deduction by 
means of truth tables also end in circularity. For example, we could attempt to 
prove that modus ponens is valid by setting up a truth tree for modus ponens. 
A truth table tells us that the value of A B is 1 (or true) if the value of A is 1 
and the value of B is 1. From this we can work out that modus ponens is a 
tautology; because there are no counter examples to the argument, e.g. it is not 
possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false due to the rules of 
inference we have established for this case.  If the truth table tells us that if A 
B is true and A is true, then a B must also be true, we are relying on the rules 
of inference of the system of deduction to show that this argument is valid, but 
we have not justified the rules of inference themselves. Therefore this is a rule-
circular argument because we are trying to show that modus ponens is valid, 
but we fall back on the very same rules of inference that we are trying to 
justify. We have assumed that A B&A |- modus ponens has a truth value 
of 1 if A and B both have truth values of 1, but this rule itself is what we are 
trying to justify in the first place. Haack shows a counter example in which we 
could justify “modus morons,”19 where affirming the consequent has a truth 
value of 1. If we say A|-affirming the consequent) is justified by the 
rules of inference of modus morons in which said argument has a truth value 
of 1 if A and B have a truth value of 1, we are in a similar position as we were 
justifying modus ponens. So, it seems that the same justification we used for 
modus ponens can be employed on a very counter intuitive argument. Unlike 
Carroll’s paradox, which suffers from premise circularity, this argument fails 
due to rule circularity. We assume the truth values of various arguments 
because of the rules of inference of the system, and this shows that the 
arguments are valid, but in trying to prove entailment, we presuppose that the 
argument is valid in setting up the rules of inference. If we change the rules of 
inference, we could just as easily justify counterintuitive arguments like modus 
morons. 
 
Inductive Justification of Deduction 
 
Although I agree with Haack that deduction faces problems which are 
analogous to the problem of induction, I will argue that whatever circularity 
arises from the aforementioned justifications of deduction, we are nonetheless 
not left in a position as problematic as induction. I will show that deduction 
can be vindicated pragmatically whilst avoiding some of the problems of the 
pragmatic justification in induction. Although we cannot justify induction by 
deductive means, we can have better results from justifying deduction by 
                                                 
19 Haack, op cit., 116.  
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inductive means, hence deduction is not problematic to the same extent as 
induction.  
As mentioned previously, Haack notes the difficulty in justifying 
induction using induction and deduction using deduction. To justify induction 
by means of induction not only leads to question begging, but it also allows 
strange systems to pass the test like counter-induction, which we have no 
reason to believe as being truth preserving. Alternatively, justifying deduction 
deductively leads either to circularity or to strange examples such as modus 
morons. Haack also argues that justifying induction deductively or vice versa is 
problematic. It seems clear that one cannot justify induction deductively but I 
will argue that an inductive justification of deduction, although a little strange, 
has the benefit of being truth preserving, hence is a preferable outcome than 
justifying induction deductively or induction inductively. If the vindication of 
deduction or by syntactic rule following or by definitional validity fail, we can 
fall back on a pragmatic vindication which show that deductive inferences are 
truth preserving. In other words, in such cases, if anything will work, deduction 
will.  Induction cannot be justified by means of deduction because deduction is 
too strong. Inductive inference are not valid, thus we cannot accept this as a 
viable justification. Yet although induction is too weak to justify deduction, it is 
preferable to have a conclusion which is less bold than too bold. For example, 
the following argument is an inductive inference. 
 
P1) All cases of observation O have had property P  
Therefore 
C) The next O will have P 
 
To state that this argument is deductively valid, that given the premise 
we must accept the conclusion, would be a mistake. This can easily be shown 
by the many cases in which all observed cases have displayed property P but 
the next case does not. It may be the case that all O’s we have observed have 
property P, but some we have not observed do not. Therefore there is a 
counter example to this argument, and justifying it deductively is incorrect. Yet 
consider the following deductive argument; 
  
Chain Argument: 
P1) If A then B 
P2) If B then C  
P3) A  
Therefore  
C) C  
 
If we say that this is a strong argument, we may be making a claim that 
is less bold than is expected for deduction. We can justify this type of argument 
inductively, stating that in the past, this form of inference has yielded true 
results, hence it will do so in the future. Deductive arguments do not make 
predictions about future events, hence they do not rely on PUN, but we can  
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justify the use of this type of argument, or the aforementioned chain argument 
in reference to perceived regularity of the reliability of the inference.  We 
expect deductively valid arguments to be tautologies as opposed to strong 
arguments. But claiming that this is a strong argument is not incorrect in the way 
it would be incorrect to say that the inductive argument is valid. It seems we 
are being less bold with our estimation of the argument. Haack’s 
aforementioned argument alludes to the fact that definitional and rule based 
justifications of deduction lead to circular reasoning in a similar way to 
Carroll’s argument which highlights the infinite regress of modus ponens. But 
if we employ a pragmatic justification of deductive inference, we have a non-
circular justification and can expect our results to be more reliable than 
inductive cases. One could argue that predictions and the uniformity of nature 
have nothing to do with deduction, but in want of a non-circular or non-
vacuous justification, we can fall back on reliability based on past instances. If 
we say that the next use of this argument will most likely give us true results 
because it has always done so in the past, we are in a better position that a 
person trying to pass an inductive argument off as a deductive argument.   
Secondly, tf I were to say that this deductive argument has given true results in 
the past, so it will probably do the same in the future, I will have a much better 
success rate than a person making the same inference about induction. One 
could expect and 100% success rate for such an inference, whereas a deductive 
justification of an inductive argument fails a-priori by intuition, or if not, then 
a-posteriori as soon as there is an example of said argument failing. 
Yet, using induction to justify deduction brings us back to the problem 
of how do we justify induction? If Carroll’s criticism stands, then both 
deduction and induction, I would argue, need to be vindicated rather than 
validated. We judge these to be good arguments if they are truth preserving. In 
Reichenbach’s vindication of induction, he shows that induction is the best 
method of predicting unknown events, we rely on it on a day to day basis and 
it can be shown to be truth preserving if the sequences has a limiting 
frequency. If the sequence has no limiting frequency, then no method of 
inference will work. If we apply this to deductive arguments, we could say that 
all deductive arguments with a limiting frequency will yield accurate results. If 
we lack any other mode of justification, we could say that many observations 
of deductive inferences leading to true results justifies the use of such 
inferences. If deductive inferences do not have limiting frequencies, then they 
will fail, but there is no better argument method to replace them. Take modus 
morons. Like counter-induction, modus morons will lead to non-truth 
preserving results, and is thus not vindicated. 
 Whereas induction is necessary for predicting future events, we also 
rely on deductive inferences on a day to day basis. For example, a friend says 
they will either meet you at your place at 6 or meet you at the party at 7. You 
friend is not at your house at 6, and assuming you can believe in the truth of 
the disjunctive premise, it seems that you can trust they will be at the party and 
not at their house or at the beach. Getting by in the world would be impossible 
without induction, but the same can be said for deduction. Deduction could be  
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vindicated in the same way as induction, and to better effect. My previous 
experience of deductive reasoning has always been truth preserving. Hence, I 
can pragmatically justify deduction in that I require deductive reasoning in 
everyday life as much as induction. Comparing the pragmatic justification of 
induction with a pragmatic justification of deduction is like comparing the 
convergence frequency of a regular die with a die that only has ones on it. I 
continue to throw the die and it continues to shows ones, the same as I 
continue to make deductive inferences and they continue to be truth 
preserving. If we were to say that there is a convergence point for deductive 
inferences, it would be 1, and continued observation would verify this. 
A problem with the pragmatic justification of induction is that it is 
unclear how many cases of an event need to be observed for the event to reach 
its limiting frequency. This frequency may alter depending on the type of event 
we are observing. Certain cases may require many observations before a 
justified inductive inference can be made. For example, how many rolls of the 
dice are required before we can say that there is an equal chance of each 
number occurring? Occasionally, one may roll a 6 on the dice 10 times in a 
row. Although this is uncommon, it is a possible outcome. Then for this 
particular experiment, it may require hundreds or thousands of rolls before we 
can show that every number has an equal chance of being rolled. If this is 
required of a justified inductive inference, and we must be pragmatic in the 
same way for a deductive inference, then one would be required to observe 
cases of deduction in the same way. How many cases of a particular deductive 
inference are required before we can be justified in that inference? Most would 
argue that, since deduction is a-priori, none. It seems silly to assume that one 
must observe deductive inferences to the same extent as inductive inferences 
before they are vindicated. But I have ruled this a-priori justification out in the 
above discussion in reference to Haack. A possible method around this is to 
claim that deduction as a method of inference in itself has already been 
vindicated. Every case of deduction that has been used in the past has been 
valid, therefore in the future we can expect every deductive inference to also be 
valid. We cannot say the same for inductive inferences. Some inductive 
inferences have failed, such as the inference about all swans being white. 
Europeans believed all swans to be white because in Europe there are no black 
swans. This inference was disproved when black swans were observed in 
Australia and New Zealand. Many such cases of induction fail in the same way, 
therefore not all cases of induction are vindicated. We must judge inductive 
inferences on a case by case basis, as has been shown in the past. On the other 
hand, there has yet never been a failure if deduction, hence we could say that 
instead of judging deduction on a case by case basis, we can alternatively 
vindicate all deductive inferences pragmatically due to all cases being accurate 
in the past.  
Whilst I agree with Haack that there can be analogous problems 
applied to deduction as well as induction, the fact that deduction is more truth 
preserving lends deduction to being more easily vindicated. In conclusion, I 
have found that induction is necessary although not guaranteed to be  
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successful in all situations. It can be vindicated by the pragmatic approach, yet 
it is still an issue as to which sequences we should assume have limiting 
frequencies. Deduction on the other hand is more truth preserving than 
induction. It is hard to imagine a world so chaotic that inductive inferences are 
useless, but it is even more difficult to imagine a world where deductive 
arguments are not truth preserving. Therefore an attempt to strengthen 
induction by weakening deduction is unsuccessful. Deduction has analogous 
difficulties but, a pragmatic vindication for deduction is more truth preserving 
than one for induction. 
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